I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.

e tekhne mimeitai ten physin – This phrase is falsely rendered as “Art is an imitation of Nature.” Aristotle does not here define art; he says only, “Art imitates Natur” and means that the artistic process is like the natural process […] It is false to say that sculpture, for instance, is an art of repose if by that be meant that sculpture is unassociated with movement. Sculpture is associated with movement in as much as it is rhythmic; for a work of sculptural art must be surveyed according to its rhythm and this surveying is an imaginary movement in space. It is not false to say that sculpture is an art of repose in that a work of sculptural art cannot be presented as itself moving in space and remain a work of sculptural art.

Change is faster and slower. But time is not. For the slow and the fast are defined by time, fast being the thing moving much in little time, slow being the thing moving little in much. But time is not defined by time, not by its being so much nor by its being of such a sort. It is clear, then, that time is not change.

If it made sense to say that time flows then it would make sense to ask how fast it flows, which doesn’t seem to be a sensible question. Some people reply that time flows at one second per second, but even if we could live with the lack of other possibilities, this answer misses the more basic aspect of the objection. A rate of seconds per second is not a rate at all in physical terms. It is a dimensionless quantity, rather than a rate of any sort.

Time is not a number with which we count but the number that is counted, and this turns out to be always different before and after, because the nows are different. The number of a hundred horses and of a hundred men is one and the same, but the things of which it is a number are different – the horses are different from the men.

The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely, but everyone says something true about the nature of things, and while individually they contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.

If there is some point to everything we do, something we want for its own sake and which explains why we do everything else, then obviously this has to be the good, the best of all. And there has to be some such point, otherwise everything would be chosen for the sake of something else and we would have an infinite regress, with the result that it would be futile and pointless to want anything at all.

[N]ot to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration).

By virtue I mean virtue of character; for this is about feelings and actions, and these admit of excess and deficiency, and an intermediate state. We can be afraid, for instance, or be confident, or have appetites, or get angry, or feel pity, and in general have pleasure and pain, both too much and too little, and in both ways not well. But having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue.