Fuck Yeah Philosophy!
archive | random | rss | mobile
Sunday | May 29, 2011
1,033 notes, Comments
philosopymind
Slide by Oliver Reichenstein of Information Architects

Slide by Oliver Reichenstein of Information Architects

Wednesday | March 10, 2010
26 notes, Comments
hofstadtercognitionmindphilosophybackground knowledge

Douglas Hofstadter on Analogy as the Core of Cognition (Stanford Presidential Lecture Series in the Humanities and Arts)

Saturday | December 19, 2009
34 notes, Comments
languagemindperson
“
Many people think that each kind of animal has its own language – including apes, dolphins, bees, and ants. It’s true that all animals, including humans, transmit information by relaying useful data back and forth to one another, or by making mental associations with present or stored stimuli so as to act. Engaging in a communicative linguistic performance, however, entails having mental states insofar as beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, dreams, fears, and the like are communicated from one being to another. So, a bee isn’t really speaking to another bee when doing his “bee dance” to transmit information about where pollen is located outside the hive. Even apes that have been taught sign language aren’t necessarily speaking – using language – to their trainers; they may be merely associating stimuli with stored memories and transmitting information. As far as we know, bees and apes don’t have experiences of joy, suffering, or regret to communicate.
— Robert Arp and Tracie Mahaffey: ‘“And They Have A Plan”: Cylons As Persons‘ in: Jason T. Eberl (Ed.): Battlestar Galactica and philosophy: knowledge here begins out there
Saturday | December 5, 2009
11 notes, Comments
aquinasmindanthropology
“
[W]e can […] come to know the human soul’s mode of existence, on the basis of its activity. For insofar as it has an activity [viz., intellective cognition] that transcends material things, its existence, too, is raised above the body and does not depend on it. On the other hand, insofar as it is naturally suited to acquire immaterial cognition from what is material, the fulfilment of its nature clearly cannot occur without union with the body; for something is complete in its nature only if it has [in itself] the things that are required for the activity that is proper to its nature. Therefore, since the human soul, insofar as it is united to the body as a form, also has its existence raised above the body and does not depend on it, it is clear that the soul is established on the borderline between corporeal and separate [i.e., purely spiritual] substances.
— Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de anima
Thursday | May 21, 2009
2 notes, Comments
searlefreedommindsciencecausality

John Searle speaking at Google about his book Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed here are solely those of the philosophers cited and do not necessarily reflect the position of the person runing this tumblelog; they are provided "as is" to stimulate thought and criticism.
Not Quite Theme by Peter Vidani tweaked by belacqua